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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintif !-Respondent, 
vs. 
IVA LEE GILLIAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11314 
This is a criminal prosecution wherein the appellant 
was charged by an information with the crime of first de-
gree murder pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-1 (1953) 
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on December 26, 1967. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
The trial was held before the Honorable MiarceHus K. 
Snow, Judge, presiding. The jury rendered a verdict of 
guilty of murder in the first degree on February 2, 1969. 
They recommended leniency and the trial judge accordingly 
sentenced her to the Utah State Prison for life. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent asks this Court to affirm the judgment 
of the Third Judicial District Court on the basis that no 
reversible errors were committed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant, Iva Lee Gillian and a WiHiam Miller, 
had lived together for several years before separating. Even 
after the separation they had frequent contacts with each 
other. On November 4, 1967, the victim, Jesse A. Melton, 
was living with Mr. Miller in apartment No. 3 at 21 West 
1700 South in Salt Lake City, Utah (T. 304). Mr. Miller, 
who was unemployed at this time, had been staying with 
Mr. Melton for about a week prior to November 4 (T. 305). 
This apartment was very small, with only one room divided 
by a partition (T.170, 177). 
On Friday, November 3, 1969, one Bernice Simmons 
came to the apartment late that night and the three of 
them, Miller, Melton, and Mrs. Simmons, sat around and 
talked most of the night (T. 306, 314). At about six o'clock 
on the morning of the fourth, the appellant came to the 
apartment (T. 366). At this point the testimony of the 
appellant varies with that of Mr. Miller and Mrs. Simmons 
as to what type of scuffle bet\veen Miller and appellant 
actually occurred (T. 307, 309, 366). At any rate, the evi-
dence is clear that some scuffle did occur and that Miller 
shoved the appellant out the door (T. 309). At this time 
the door was locked. She then went to her car and got a 
.22 caliber gun and went to the west window of the apart-
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ment and fired the gun at least seven times into the small 
room (T. 369), killing the victim, Mr. Melton (T. 309). 
The gun was found in appellant's purse when she was 
arrested ( T. 245), and an F. B. I. ballistics expert identified 
the gun as the weapon which killed the victim (T. 348) 
and also as the weapon which fired other bullets as evi-
denced by the six casings found on the window sill (T. 
346). 
Based upon this evidence and the testimony of the 
appellant herself, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of 
murder in the first degree, with the recommendation of 
leniency. The appellant is appealing that conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARD-
ING A LESSER INCLUDED 0 FF ENS E 
WHERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE AS TO 
A LESSER OFFENSE. 
The appellant ·was convicted of first degree murder 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-3 (1953) ,i.e., " .... 
perpetrated by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of 
others and evidencing a depraved mind, regardless of hu-
man life ... " The evidence presented by the State war-
ranted the instruction of first degree murder within the 
meaning of the statute. And if the evidence does not jus-
tify an instruction of a lesser included offense, the court 
does not need to submit the lesser offense to the jury. In-
structions should not be given in a homicide case which 
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are unsupported by the evidence. State v. Condit, 101 
Utah 558, 125 P. 2d 801 (1942); State v. Pierce, 17 Utah 
2d 394, 412 P. 2d 923 (1966). 
In making this argument, the appellant assumes that 
the evidence supports a finding of second degree murder 
or even vdluntary manslaughter. This can be so only: (1) 
"When the establishment of the greater offense would nec-
essarily include proof of all the elements necessary to prove 
the lesser." State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 198, 371 P. 
2d 27, 29 (1962), (emphasis added), and (2) the evidence 
warrants such an instruction. The elements and evidence 
required to prove first degree murder by an act greatly 
dangerous to the lives of others with evidence of a depraved 
mind regardless of human life are spelled out in detail in 
State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P. 2d 153 (1946). 
The Court said: 
" ... It is not necessary that there be a previ· 
ously thought out intention to kill the person killed 
or any other particular person nor is ·there a neces-
sity for deliberate or cool weighing of such planned 
course of action. But there must be a previously 
thought out plan, design and intentiona•l doing of an 
acl which is greatly dangerous to the lives of others, 
with the knowledge and a full realization that the 
natural and probable consequences thereof wiH cause 
death or great bodily injury to other persons and 
the surrounding circumstances of such killing must 
be such as to evidence to the jury a depraved mind 
with no regard whatever for human life." Id. at 
127, 170 P. 2d at 160. 
The only elements required under this category are whether 
the evidence will justify a finding that the act which the 
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appellant did was greatly dangerous to the lives of others , 
and whether she knew when doing that act that its prob-
able consequences would be to cause death or great bodily 
injury, and whether the circumstances of the killing evi-
dence a depraved mind without any regard for human life. 
If the evidence supports this category, then there can be no 
second degree murder because second degree murder is any 
other killing which would constitute "murder at common 
law." Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-3 (1953). If there can be 
no second degree murder under the evidence then there 
can be no instruction given. The Court further stated in 
Thornpson, supra, that: 
"The evidence in those respects is clearly suf-
ficient unless it only indicated an intention to kill 
the deceased, rather then that it was directed at 
people generalily. We think frorn the manner of fir-
ing indiscriminately at all the people in the room 
the evidence was sufficient to justify a submission 
on that question." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) 
This fact alone seemed sufficient to warrant a first degree 
murder instruction. 
The ,appellant also suggests that the crime of voluntary 
manslaughter was warranted by the evidence. This sug-
gestion assumes again that voluntary manslaughter is "nec-
essarily" included in first degree murder. This is not the 
case as was pointed out in State v. Mitchell, 3 Utaih 2d 70, 
278 P. 2d 618 (1955) .. 
"Voluntary manslaughter is not necessarily in-
c'luded in first degree murder. Nor is it always the 
duty of the court to instruct on the lesser offense, 
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-for example where either a conviction or outright 
acquittal of a particular offense is mandatory, leav-
ing no room to hold an accused for any other of-
fense." Id. at 75, 278 P. 2d at 621. 
The appellant has assumed the lesser offense rwithout ac-
tually showing that it is included within the greater. Vol-
untary "manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human 
being without malice(,) upon a sudden quarrel or in the 
heat of passion." Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-5 (1953). The 
appellant contends that merely because there was a quarrel 
and she was pushed out the door, the evidence warrants an 
instruction of voluntary manslaughter. However, there 
must be "sudden passion" upon reasonable provocation be-
fore the law will reduce the killing to manslaughter. State 
V. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 102, 396 P. 2d 414 ( 1964); Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-30-5 (1953). The element of sudden quar-
rel or heat of passion was not found in this case to be the 
cause of the killing. On the contrary, it was a previously 
thought out plan, design and intentional doing of an act 
which was greatly dangerous to the lives of others. The 
appellant, after confronting Miller, rwent back to her car, 
took out the gun she had brought with her, went to the 
window and fired it into the smaH room (T. 369). The 
victim was not even the person with whom she had scuffled 
(T. 309) .. She fully realized and knew that the natural and 
probable consequences of the act of shooting into the room 
would cause death or great bodily injury to one or more 
persons, and in so doing she evidenced a depraved mind 
with no regard for human life (T. 369). The difference 
between first degree murder in this category and voluntary 
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manslaughter is the difference between reason and passion. 
State V. Thompson, supra. The test to determine Which 
governs in each case was described in People v. Calton, 5 
Utah 451, 16 Pac. 902 (1888) as ·the "prepondering" cause: 
"But the lruw charges the ·act to malice or pas-
sion as the one or the other is found to be the pre-
pondering cause of the act .... The passion must be 
such as is sometimes called "irresistable;" yet it is 
too strong to say that the reason of the party should 
be dethroned, or he should act in a whirlwind of 
passion. There must be sudden passion, upon rea-
sonable provocation, to negative the ideal uf malice; 
and the passion must proceed from what the law 
accepts as adequate cause; else it will not reduce the 
felonious killing to manslaugihter." Id., at 460, 16 
Pac. at 907. 
This is merely a restatement of the common law and has 
been followed by this Court in more recent cases. State v. 
Thompson and State v. Gallegos, supra. 
The State submits that voluntary manslaughter was 
not a lesser inc'luded offense in light of the evidence pre-
sented at trial, and that the trial court correctly withheld 
the instructions on the lesser included offenses. The ele-
ment of sudden quarrel or heat uf passion is not present in 
this case. On tihe contrary, the evidence clearly warrants 
an instruction of first degree murder. 
Like Thompson, the appellant shot a gun into a room 
with several people (T. 279). The apartment was very 
small ( T. 305) , actually only one room ( T. 305) . She fired 
at least six shots into the room, one hitting and killing Mr. 
Melton. There were holes in the door and wall (T. 232, 
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238), in the window screen (T. 237), and in the drapes (T. 
238). Two witnesses identified the appelliant as the one 
who came to the apartment and SJCuffled ·with Miller just 
prior to the shooiting (T. 275, 306). There is no question 
as to who did the shooting, but the question is why did the 
shooting take place,i.e., was it a result of a sudden quarrel 
or a result of malice? The facts clearly show malice and an 
intention to do harm to aH the people in the room. She was 
not directing her attack at Melton alone, but rather was 
showing no regard whatever for human life (T. 372). 
"She had entertained the thought of making Miller 
squirm a little bit, since that wasn't the first time. He beat 
me up a few years ago" (T. 373). Surely this fact alone is 
evidence of malice. Considered with the other •evidence, the 
act wa:s clearly dangerous to tlle lives of many peopile and 
did evidence a depraved mind. And as this court said in 
Thompson: 
"We think from the manner of firing indis-
criminately at all the people in the room the evi-
dence was sufficient to justify a submission on that 
question, 110 Utah at 127, 170 P. 2d at 160." 
The elements of first degree murder under the cate-
gory of an act greaitly dangerous to the lives of others evi-
dencing a depraved mind were clearly shown by the prose-
cution. The information only charged murder in the first 
degree (T. 10), and based upon the fact tllat the elements 
of an offense are matters of law to be determined by the 
judge, the appellant's reliance on State v. Ferguson, 74 
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Utah 263, 279 Pac. 55 (1929) is unwarrant€d. This is a 
"clear case" within the meaning of thait term as used in 
State V. Hyams, 64 Utah 285, 230 Pac. 349 ( 1924), and the 
trial court correctly determined as a matter of law that the 
evidence did not warrant an instruction of a lesser offense. 
It was not "necessarily" included and the court S10 ruled. On 
the other hand, the elements of "sudden" quarrel or heat of 
passion were not shown by the appellant to be the prepond-
ering cause, and therefore the crime of voluntary man-
slaughter could not have been included as a lesser offense in 
light of the evidence, and the trial oourt correctly refused to 
.so instruct the jury. Based upon the actual ielements involved 
and those actually proven by the ev~dence, and also upon 
the fact that appellant relies solely on her own tes~mony 
to show voluntary mansliaughter, the respondent submits 
that no error resulted in the tria:l court and the decision 
below must be affirmed. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PER-
MITTING THE PROSECUTION TO CROSS-EX-
AMINE THE APPELLANT AS TO A PAST 
A'.CT WHICH WAS RELEVANT TO THE 
CRIME COMMITTED. 
The act being challenged occu11red approximately seven 
years before this shooting and 1was between the appellant 
and apparently Mr. Miller (T. 335, 340, 379) .. rfhe first 
time this was objected to was during the State's re~direct 
examination of Mr. Miller (T. 339). The defense counsel 
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had already brought this evidence out on cross-examination 
( T. 335) and the re-direct was clearly within the scope of 
the prior examination by defense counsel. Furthermore, 
the defense counsel broug'ht this out realizing that it was 
about the appellant and thus opened the door for incrimin-
ating and impeaching testimony against the appellant. 
The test as to whether this testimony is admisstble iis 
well founded in Utah. In State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 
361 P. 2d 412 (1961), the court said: 
". . . Where evidence has special relevancy to 
prove the crime of which the defendant stands 
charged, it may be allowed for that purpose; and 
the fact that 1it shows another crime will not render 
the evidence inadmissible." Id., at 12, 361 P. 2d at 
415. 
See also, State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P. 2d 772 
( 1969). This evidence does have special relevancy to prove 
the crime charged. It shows a lack of sudden passion, for 
example, thus eliminating voluntary manslaughter. It 
shows that appellant entertained malice against Mr. Miller, 
and it shows the necessary intent and malice to evidence a 
depraved mind. The elements necessary to prove first de-
gree murder in the category of greatly dangerous acts in-
cludes intent and malice. Surely, the 1act challenged by the 
appellant does have the special releviancy to prove the crime 
of first degree muvder in the category as charged. 
Furthermore, the reception of this evidence was not 
prejudicial to the appellant. In light of the abundance of 
other evidence connecting her with the killing, it cannot be 
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that she suffered undue prejudice by the reception of this 
testimony. This is especially true in 1'ight of the fact that 
appelilant's counsel brought out this information prim- to 
the State's examination of the appellant (T. 335). The 
Supreme Court must "give judgment without regard to 
errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights 
of the parties. If error has been committed, it shaill not be 
presumed to have resulted in prejudice." Utah Oode Ann. 
§ 77-42-1 (1953). 
CONCLUSION 
There were no errors committed by the trial court 
which would warrant a new trial. The court wa:s correct 
in refusing the instructions of lesser included offenses be-
cause it was a "clear case" which did not warrant such in-
structions. Furthermore, the trial court did not err in al-
lowing the appellant to tesrbify conceming an act relevant 
to the crime charged. Where this evidence has been brought 
out by the defense counsel himself, he cannot claim that ap-
pe1lant was prejudiced thereby. We submit that the judg-
ment of conviction for murder .in the first degree must be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
